```
1
 1
                          UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                         NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
 2
                                EASTERN DIVISION
 3
      MIMEDX GROUP, INC.,
                       Plaintiff.
 4
 5
                                                No. 16 C 11715
            VS.
                                                Chicago, Illinois
 6
      MICHAEL FOX,
                                                March 8, 2017
                                                9:33 o'clock a.m.
 7
                       Defendant.
 8
                            TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
 9
                      BEFORE THE HONORABLE MANISH S. SHAH
10
      APPEARANCES:
11
       For the Plaintiff:
                                  WARGO & FRENCH
                                  BY: MS. SHANON J. McGINNIS
12
                                  999 Peachtree Street, 26th Floor
13
                                  Atlanta, Georgia 30309
                                  (404) 853-1575
14
                                  SIDLEY AUSTIN, L.L.P.
                                  BY: MS. AMI N. WYNNE
15
                                  One South Dearborn Street
                                  Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 853-7000
16
17
       For the Defendant:
                                  GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, L.L.C.
                                  BY: MR. CHRISTOPHER S. GRIESMEYER
18
                                       MR. ADAM C. MAXWELL
19
                                  Two North LaSalle Street, Suite 1601
                                  Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 428-2750
20
21
22
                        COLLEEN M. CONWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR
                             Official Court Reporter
23
                     219 South Dearborn Street, Room 1714
                            Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 435-5594
24
25
                       colleen conway@ilnd.uscourts.gov
```

1 (Proceedings heard in open court:) 2 THE CLERK: 16 C 11715, MiMedx versus Fox. 3 MS. WYNNE: Good morning, Your Honor. Ami Wynne with 4 Sidley Austin on behalf of the plaintiff. 5 MS. McGINNIS: Shanon McGinnis on behalf of Wargo --6 or with Wargo & French on behalf of the plaintiff as well. 7 MR. GRIESMEYER: Good morning, Your Honor. Chris Griesmeyer on behalf of the defendant, Mr. Fox. 8 9 MR. MAXWELL: Adam Maxwell also on behalf of the 10 defendant, Mr. Fox. 11 THE COURT: Good morning. Before we talk about the 12 motion for an order of replevin or TRO or preliminary 13 injunction, let's talk about some issues raised in the status 14 report and let's get a schedule in place. 15 So the defense anticipates a motion to dismiss? 16 Yes. MR. GRIESMEYER: 17 THE COURT: At least it says so in the status report. 18 MR. GRIESMEYER: We do, yes. We need a little bit of 19 time. We're hoping to get until next Friday. We've obviously 20 been a little bit derailed over the past several days 21 responding to, you know, the motion for replevin, so we were 22 hoping to have an extension until next Friday to file our 23 motion to dismiss. 24 THE COURT: And is that a motion that seeks to 25 dismiss all claims?

	3
1	MR. GRIESMEYER: It would, yes, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: That's fine with me. I'll give you until
3	March 17th, is that the date you had in mind? Is that what
4	you mean by next Friday?
5	MR. GRIESMEYER: It is.
6	THE COURT: Okay.
7	MR. GRIESMEYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: How much time would the plaintiff like to
9	respond to that motion?
10	MS. McGINNIS: The 30 days, although I don't know
11	that it would take that much time, but I'd like the normal
12	amount of the normal allotted time. If he's because this
13	is the first that we've heard that that motion to dismiss may
14	be addressed to all the claims, so
15	THE COURT: That's fine.
16	THE CLERK: Counsel, that takes you to Monday, April
17	17th.
18	MS. McGINNIS: Okay.
19	THE COURT: And how much time would you like to
20	reply?
21	MR. GRIESMEYER: If we could have 21 days?
22	THE CLERK: May 8th, counsel.
23	MR. GRIESMEYER: Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Notwithstanding the notion of a motion to
25	dismiss coming that may resolve all the claims, I don't believe

that discovery should wait. There is some history here. There is the prospect of -- if the motion to dismiss is not successful, the prospect of counterclaims by the defendant. And from what I've seen so far, I think the parties ought to act early to get the actual facts known to both sides as expeditiously as possible so that they can truly evaluate what they want to do with this kind of case.

So I don't agree that discovery should wait until we have the pleadings finalized.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Understood. Judge, our -- just on behalf of the defendant, our motivation in making that request was simply a matter of economics. Mr. Fox is an individual. He is not working. He has attempted to find employment. His -- you know, the current employer who he was about to go to work for pulled the employment offer away from him when he saw MiMedx's press release announcing this lawsuit.

So he has no income coming in and, you know, it was just simply a matter of economics. We were hoping to push off the costs of discovery until we figured out if there's even going to be a lawsuit here.

THE COURT: And it's not an unreasonable position -- MR. GRIESMEYER: Okay.

THE COURT: -- to take, and I would expect the parties on both sides to be cost-sensitive about early discovery when you know that there is a motion -- and I am

directing this to the plaintiff, when you know there is a motion to dismiss coming that's attacking all claims, you know that you have to spend time briefing that motion. Maybe you don't also want to be spending time on contentious discovery in these next few weeks. And I would expect both sides should be able to figure out what it makes sense to do early, and hopefully largely by agreement. There might be key facts that both sides agree both sides ought to know now, and those are the kinds of things I expect the parties to be able to meet and confer on in these first weeks while I am also going to be occupied with your motion to dismiss as well.

So my guess is you won't want to distract me from resolving the motion to dismiss by filing a bunch of discovery disputes with me either. So everyone keep that in mind.

I think it makes sense for the parties to exchange initial disclosures by March 22nd. And then I am going to set a close of fact discovery of October 9th -- actually, October 10th. 2017.

I am not going to set an expert schedule or dispositive motions schedule until we have a better handle on what actual experts might be needed and whether there would be dispositive motions.

MS. McGINNIS: I understand.

THE COURT: I am also going to set a date that any requests to amend the pleadings must be made by August 8th,

which would then give you two months of fact discovery to wrap things up, but also an incentive to amend your pleadings at a point after you've gotten some facts under your belts and you can intelligently choose what claims are really worth bringing while giving you sufficient time to continue some discovery to wrap that up.

MS. McGINNIS: Thank you.

THE COURT: So I think that is a schedule that makes sense where things stand right now.

Does anyone have any strong objections to that plan?

MS. McGINNIS: No, Your Honor.

MR. GRIESMEYER: No, Your Honor. It seems just fine.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's talk about the motion.

The motion to file excess pages on the response is granted.

I will say that I don't think you needed that many pages, and don't expect that I will grant excess pages going forward. I think you could have cut ten pages out of the response.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Understood, Judge. If you --

THE COURT: But things are moving fast --

MR. GRIESMEYER: Yes.

THE COURT: -- and I read it. It's fine.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Thank you. That's exactly it. If I had more time, I could have given you a shorter brief.

THE COURT: But I have the motion, I have the response. Both sides have submitted evidence by way of affidavit. I don't need anybody to repeat what's in the briefs. I have a few questions --

MS. McGINNIS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- that I think would be a better use of our time to stay focused on.

So Mr. Fox has now repeatedly disclaimed any property interest in these devices, and he was not served with the complaint until mid-January.

MR. GRIESMEYER: January 16th.

THE COURT: The contract pretty clearly says he had to return the devices within three days of his employment being terminated, and nothing in the contract says that the plaintiff had to request the devices to be returned.

So my question is why didn't he return the devices on January 4th or 5th, taking into account the holiday?

MR. GRIESMEYER: Sure. Candidly, he -- he didn't -- it occurred to him that he had them. He has not accessed these devices, he hasn't turned them on since he was terminated on, you know, December 29th.

You know, it -- you know, it's not unimportant to note that, you know, MiMedx did terminate him and then less

than two hours later filed the lawsuit, and it really was at that point in time that whatever sort of evidence he had he had an obligation to preserve.

And that's all that has happened here. He doesn't want these computers. He would very much like to return them. The only thing he has done is after he got the complaint, he hired counsel. And then after he received the letter on the 24th, he realized, "Oh, that's right, I have computers." He gave them to us. We opened the box, took an inventory, figured out what was there, and then that same day sent them off to the computer forensic expert for imaging -- standard protocol -- and they've been sitting with the computer forensic expert in the evidence preservation vault ever since.

THE COURT: Okay. The problem, though, is the -Mr. Fox is placing a condition on the return of property that
he agrees is not his. The condition is that he get
confirmation that he has successfully imaged the property.

I am -- let me --

MR. GRIESMEYER: Yeah.

THE COURT: I'm going to --

MR. GRIESMEYER: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- cut you off only because I am going to tell you, I understand why he's done what he's done. I am just narrowing our conversation on to what I view as the key facts --

MR. GRIESMEYER: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: -- which is he says he doesn't want these devices, he's acknowledged they're not his and they're not his property, but he's not going to return them because he wants confirmation that he's got a forensically-sound image. That condition that he's placing on the return of the property is just that, it's a condition. It's not an unconditional agreement to return the property, and it is a type of refusal to return the property.

And my -- the idea that he gave the devices to his attorneys who then gave it to StoneTurn, and so he's not in possession of them, I think is not quite right, because my guess is if he ordered StoneTurn to release the devices, they would follow his direction because they are his agent.

And do I have that right?

MR. GRIESMEYER: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GRIESMEYER: That is correct.

THE COURT: And then the question I had for the company, from the plaintiff is when did the company activate the access restrictions on the devices?

MS. McGINNIS: That is a standard protocol upon termination. I don't know the exact date that it happened. But any time that an employee leaves voluntarily or is otherwise terminated, in order to protect confidential

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

information/trade secrets, so that it doesn't fall into the wrong hands, that is a standard protocol. My -- I suspect that it happened -- if it didn't happen the day that he was terminated, it happened within a day or two after that, so --MR. GRIESMEYER: Well, then it would have happened after the lawsuit was filed, and that is tampering with evidence, and they shouldn't have done that. MS. McGINNIS: It --THE COURT: It may or may not be tampering with evidence. It may be an act of evidence preservation. MS. McGINNIS: Exactly. THE COURT: It's not --MR. GRIESMEYER: Understood. THE COURT: That's not an issue that I think is particularly relevant to our debate right now, which is where should these devices be right now. MR. GRIESMEYER: I understand. THE COURT: Do they belong in the StoneTurn vault or do they belong someplace else? That's the only question I am going to address this morning. Whether people were bad actors with respect to the devices in a way that led us here today is not really the limited question that I think I can answer this morning based on what's been presented. If I ordered the return of the devices, do you have

the mechanism in place to have someone available to receive

them?

MS. McGINNIS: Yes, Your Honor. As a matter of fact, we had even offered that on Friday to have somebody from DTI go and pick them up from StoneTurn. I've got somebody on standby.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to comment, plaintiff, on the idea that your replevin action wasn't verified, so it doesn't comply with the Illinois statute?

MS. McGINNIS: I do, Your Honor. As Your Honor knows, there is no mechanism for verified complaints in federal court. That is a strictly state-court procedural issue, not a substantive issue. But regardless, I think that we've addressed any need for verification, assuming that the Court thinks that there's a need for verification, by the submission of the declarations of Ms. Lawson and Mr. Pearson. They're declarations, which are sworn statements under oath, which is the exact same thing as a verification. Addressed all of the facts with respect to the replevin cause of action.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what we are going to do. I have read the motion, the response, the affidavits, and I do find that a preliminary injunction should issue pursuant to Rule 65.

The plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of both its specific performance claim and its replevin actions, because it's not contested that the devices belong to plaintiff. Defendant has expressly

disclaimed any property interest in the devices, or their contents for that matter. And it is likely that the contract covers the identified devices, including the data contained therein, and is a reasonable enforceable covenant as part of a confidentiality/noncompete contract.

The defendant detained the devices well past the three-day grace period provided for in the contract, and it's, therefore, likely that he breached that provision of the contract. It's also likely, as a result, that he has wrongfully detained the property.

And plaintiff's interest in the property is superior, in my view, to defendant's litigation interest in preserving the evidence because he was not supposed to have the devices in his possession in mid-January of 2017. Giving the property to his agents, his lawyers, StoneTurn, did not relieve him of possession or control.

There is no dispute that the plaintiff's data is contained on the devices, and I do find it likely that the nature of the data is such that plaintiff is irreparably harmed by being unable to inspect and analyze its own property. And remember, these are their devices in the first place.

That defendant has elected to use a reputable company to attempt to preserve the data doesn't, in my view, alleviate the harm to plaintiff in being able to control its own property. And that harm is not adequately remedied by money

damages, even in a breach of contract claim, because here we are talking about specific performance of Mr. Fox's obligation by contract to return the property, and that's an equitable remedy that I think would be appropriate here where there is proprietary data that belongs to plaintiff and does not belong to defendant, and the parties have agreed by contract that defendant can't keep it. So money damages are not an adequate remedy and the harm to plaintiff from continued separation from its property is irreparable.

Mr. Fox will not be harmed at all because he has no property interest in the devices. And his obligation to preserve evidence related to this litigation does not give him any right to possess property that doesn't belong to him.

I don't agree that the allegations that the plaintiff is a bad actor with respect to ESI are sufficient to create a risk of harm to the defendant here, certainly not one that outweighs the plaintiff's interest in having its property returned unconditionally.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Sure.

THE COURT: The public interest is negligible but generally favors the enforcement of the parties' contract. The balance of harms favors the plaintiff.

No bond is necessary because the risk that defendant is wrongfully enjoined is quite low here. And the injunction that I am issuing will not cause Mr. Fox to incur any costs

14 that he hasn't already accepted a willingness to bear by taking 1 2 his devices and hiring StoneTurn to maintain them. 3 So I am going to enter an injunction later today 4 directing Mr. Fox, his agents, and anyone acting in concert with him with notice of the injunction to return the original 5 devices, the HP laptop, the iPad, the iPhone, to plaintiff's 6 7 designated agent by 5:00 p.m. tomorrow. And is that going to happen here? 8 9 MS. McGINNIS: Yes. Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 10 11 MR. GRIESMEYER: The devices are in Boston, in 12 StoneTurn's office in Boston, so it will take -- I will contact 13 them immediately after we're done with court and find out -- I would imagine they would be able to have them delivered, you 14 15 know, tomorrow. 16 MS. McGINNIS: Your Honor --17 THE COURT: I am asking --18 MS. McGINNIS: -- I'm quite certain that there's a 19 DTI representative in --20 MR. GRIESMEYER: That's fine. If they're really that 21 concerned about it, that's fine. 22 THE COURT: I am asking because --23 MR. GRIESMEYER: Judge -- yes. 24 THE COURT: -- I am either going to say 5:00 p.m. 25 Eastern time or 5:00 p.m. Central time. I'll give you 5:00

p.m. Eastern time.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Fair enough.

Judge, can I ask this? With --

THE COURT: Let me finish --

MR. GRIESMEYER: Oh, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: -- the scope of my injunction.

MR. GRIESMEYER: I apologize.

THE COURT: Because I am also enjoining the defense from accessing or attempting to access any images or copies of the data contained -- that was contained on the original devices until further order of the Court.

You, the defense, must maintain any images or copies that might exist in a secure environment without accessing them. I am not ordering them to return copies because I conclude a more narrowly-tailored injunction limited to the original devices and preserving without access the images while litigation commences will best preserve both sides' incentive to be cooperative and efficient in discovery and won't cause any irreparable harm to the plaintiff.

And if at some point down the road there is an argument that the plaintiff has not fully complied with some discovery request or is hiding the ball about data that should be contained on the devices, then there may be an argument that I should let someone look at the images and confirm what's on there. We'll see if that happens. But I am not convinced that

we need assurance now that those images were successfully duplicated. That's a risk that I think is borne by the defendant by the nature of the choices he made leading up to today.

But, as I said, if there's an argument, I'll certainly hear it out and we might be able to revisit the images, and we'll leave it at that.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Judge, could I interject?

THE COURT: You may. So that will be the injunction.

MR. GRIESMEYER: Could we also ask, Judge, that the order require the devices to be delivered not to plaintiff but, rather, to DTI, where DTI would hold them in an evidence preservation vault? They could do imaging, but they're not going to release the original devices back to the plaintiff, because Mr. Fox is very concerned about the information that is on these devices and he wants to make sure that that information is preserved, and he wants to make sure that, you know, there is no issue about that information potentially being deleted.

MS. McGINNIS: Your Honor, we -- we've already represented to counsel as an officer of the court that the image -- that the devices would go to DTI, be maintained in an evidence locker for preservation after a mirror image is made, and that any ESI or any discovery would be done off of the mirror image, so --

```
1
                THE COURT: So let me ask it a different way.
 2
                MS. McGINNIS: Yes.
 3
                THE COURT: Do you have any objection to the
 4
      injunction saying the devices are to be turned over to
      plaintiff's designated agent, namely DTI, by 5:00 p.m.?
 5
 6
                MS. McGINNIS: I do not have any problem with that,
 7
      Your Honor.
 8
                THE COURT:
                            Okay.
 9
                MS. McGINNIS: So no objection.
                THE COURT: I will make that clear in the injunction.
10
11
                MR. GRIESMEYER:
                                 Thank you.
12
                MS. McGINNIS: Your Honor, I do have two issues that
13
      I'd like to discuss.
14
                THE COURT: Go ahead.
15
                MS. McGINNIS: First of all, in our papers, we
16
      identified that Mr. Fox had possession of a laptop, an iPad, an
17
      and iPhone -- and in defendant's papers, they referenced two
18
      laptops and an iPhone -- and I just want to make sure that
19
      we're talking about the same stuff, because if there's another
20
      laptop they want to --
21
                MR. GRIESMEYER: That is a good point. In fact --
22
            There's actually four devices.
23
                MS. McGINNIS: Okay.
24
                MR. GRIESMEYER: We received two laptops and an
25
      iPhone, and then very recently, Mr. Fox located an iPad.
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
recently went through a divorce. The iPad was sitting in a
file folder, a vertical file folder with a bunch of papers, and
he happened to be going through it at his new residence and he
saw it and he said, "Oh, shoot."
          That iPad is with StoneTurn. Hasn't been imaged.
Nothing has been downloaded. It's just sitting with StoneTurn.
That will be turned over, of course, with the two laptops and
the iPhone.
          THE COURT: Do you have any identifying description
for the second laptop?
          MS. McGINNIS: Second laptop, uh-huh.
          MR. GRIESMEYER: We do. I -- we do. I don't have it
at my fingertips right here, but I can -- I will find the
time --
          THE COURT: Well, I -- what I am going to --
          MR. GRIESMEYER: -- certainly.
          THE COURT: What the injunction will say is I'll
enumerate the three devices that I have specific identifying
information for, but it applies to all plaintiff-owned devices.
And I don't think there's going to be a dispute --
          MR. GRIESMEYER: There won't. And we will --
          THE COURT: -- about what that covers.
          MR. GRIESMEYER: We will include that in the delivery
to DTI.
         MS. McGINNIS: Thank you. The other issue that I'd
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

There

like to address -- you know, I understand Your Honor's order that they get to maintain a copy of what -- or they get to maintain whatever they copied and that they can't access it. Is it possible -- we would request that we be permitted to have a copy of what they have so that -- again, it can be maintained in an evidence vault the same way that theirs is, but that way we know what they have as well. Obviously, as we've had --THE COURT: That's the kind of thing that falls under what you had previously said as: Let's do discovery in the ordinary process. MS. McGINNIS: Okay. THE COURT: If you want to make --MS. McGINNIS: That's fine. THE COURT: -- a request through ordinary discovery mechanisms of that kind of thing, you can meet and confer about it and see if you can reach some kind of agreement. Or if you don't, then I'll hear you on it. But let's just do things the ordinary way at this point. MS. McGINNIS: Absolutely, Your Honor. I just wanted to make sure that I understood how far that went. And just to clarify, the devices that were imaged was a -- the two laptops and the iPhone, and the iPad has not been imaged? MR. GRIESMEYER: The iPad has not been imaged. I do

not recall if they were able to image the iPhone or not.

20 1 has been images taken of the two computers. 2 MS. McGINNIS: Okay. MR. GRIESMEYER: There may have been an image taken 3 of the iPhone. I will confirm with them. 4 MS. McGINNIS: Okay. 5 MR. GRIESMEYER: But I -- if I recall, I believe they 6 were unable to do it because the password was -- passcode was 7 changed on the iPhone. 8 9 MS. McGINNIS: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? 10 11 MS. McGINNIS: No. Your Honor. That's all I have. 12 THE COURT: All right. I will set you down for a 13 status about a month after the motion to dismiss gets fully 14 briefed. 15 THE CLERK: Let's see. Everyone, how does Friday, 16 June 9th at 9:30 work for you? 17 MR. GRIESMEYER: That will be fine. 18 MS. McGINNIS: I'm sure that will be fine, Your 19 Honor. 20 MS. WYNNE: That's fine. 21 THE CLERK: Thank you. THE COURT: Is there anything else we should cover 22 23 this morning? 24 MS. McGINNIS: No, Your Honor. I don't think so. 25 MR. GRIESMEYER: No, I don't believe so, Judge.

```
21
                THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
 1
 2
                MS. McGINNIS: Thank you.
 3
                MS. WYNNE: Thank you, Your Honor.
 4
                MR. GRIESMEYER: Thank you.
 5
           (Proceedings concluded.)
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	
4	
5	I, Colleen M. Conway, do hereby certify that the
6	foregoing is a complete, true, and accurate transcript of the
7	proceedings had in the above-entitled case before the
8	HONORABLE MANISH S. SHAH, one of the Judges of said Court, at
9	Chicago, Illinois, on March 8, 2017.
10	
11	
12	/s/ Colleen M. Conway, CSR, RMR, CRR 03/08/17
13	Official Court Reporter Date United States District Court
14	Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division
15	Lastern Division
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	